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RECENT DECISIONS
BANKS AND BANKING-JOINT SAVINGS ACCOUNTS-EFFECT OF
SECTION 239(3) IN SURVIVORSHIP AcTioN.-Decedent, during a fatal
illness, directed that respondent-daughter be given powers of attorney
over several savings bank accounts in order to facilitate the payment
of bills. After a private consultation with her attorney, decedent and
her daughter signed statutory joint account forms for two of these
accounts and powers of attorney for one. Upon decedent's death,
respondent, as executrix of decedent's estate, refused to charge her-
self with the proceeds of two joint accounts, claiming title thereto
under Section 239(3) of the New York Banking Law. The Court
reversed the appellate division and reinstated the Surrogate's finding
that the joint accounts were not knowingly and consciously created,
holding that since there was a question of the competency of the de-
positor and the genuineness of her act, the use of the statutory form
in creating the joint deposits was not conclusive of her intention to
vest title in respondent. Matter of Creekinore, 1 "N.Y.2d 284, 135
N.E.2d 193 (1956).
At"common law, a deposit by one in the name of himself and
another or survivor was unavailing, in and of itself, to give to the
other any interest whatsoever.1 The depositor's intention was the
determining factor and a deposit in two names was presumptively for
convenience only,2 except in the case of husband and wife.3 In 1909,
the Savings Bank Act was amended to provide that when an account
was opened in any savings bank in the name of the depositor and
another, and in form to be paid to either or the survivor, the account
should become the property of such persons as joint tenants.4 Follow-
ing the adoption of this legislation, the Court of Appeals, in Clary v.
Fitzgerald,5 recognized that the Legislature had created a statutory
joint tenancy and that providing for the right of survivorship by a
depositor was a presumptive acceptance of such tenancy by him.
However, it was indicated that the estate of the depositor could show
1 DePuy v. Stevens, 37 App. Div. 289, 55 N.Y. Supp. 810 (4th Dep't 1899);
Kelly v. Beers, 194 N.Y. 49, 59, 86 N.E. 980, 984 (1909) (dictum).2 See Kelly v. Beers, supra note 1; Matter of Bolin, 136 N.Y. 177, 32 N.E.
626 (1892). See also Note, 11 CoRNE.L L.Q. 525, 526 (1926).
3 West v. McCullough, 123 App. Div. 846, 108 N.Y. Supp. 493 (2d Dep't
1908), aff'd %ithout opinion, 194 N.Y. 518, 87 N.E. 1130 (1909) ; see McElroy
v. Albany Say. Bank, 8 App. Div. 46, 40 N.Y. Supp. 422 (3d Dep't 1896).
4 Laws of N.Y. 1909, c. 10, § 144.
5 155 App. Div. 659, 140 N.Y. Supp. 536 (4th Dep't 1913), aff'd zithout
opinion, 213 N.Y. 696, 107 N.E. 1075 (1915).
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that the account was opened only for the convenience of the depositor
and that it was not the latter's intention to transfer the property in-
terest to the co-depositor, notwithstanding the statute and the fact
that the depositor had intentionally opened the account in this manner.6
In 1914, therefore, the Legislature amended the Banking Law to
its present wording, making an account in the joint and survivorship
form, in the absence of fraud or undue influence, conclusive evidence
of joint tenancy in any action involving either the bank or the sur-
vivor.7 The form employed in the creation of the account now became
controlling.8 If an account is opened in conformity with the statute a
rebuttable presumption at once arises that the interests of the de-
positors are those of joint tenants. Upon the death of one, the pre-
sumption becomes conclusive in favor of the survivor in respect to
any monies left in the account. 9 The actual intention of the depositor
is immaterial,' 0 for, in such a case, the presumption that title passes
to the survivor is irrefutable by proof, and, therefore, a rule of sub-
stantive law.11
The conclusive effect of the statutory form was questioned in
Matter of Fenelon 12 and again in Matter of Yauch 13 when it was
held that the form of the account was not controlling where the de-
cedent did not knowingly or consciously change or establish the ac-
count to vest title in the survivor. The actual effect of these holdings,
however, is -limited, on the facts, to instances where an agent of the
decedent, or the bank, added the statutory language without decedent's
knowledge or consent.
In the instant case, all that the statute requires in regard to form
had been complied with, and there was no evidence of either fraud
or undue influence. It was, in the opinion of the minority, clearly a
6 In the words of the court: "It may be true that the depositors, or their
representatives, as between themselves may be permitted to show by other com-
petent evidence that title as joint owners was not intended to be established nor
in fact conferred." Clary v. Fitzgerald, 155 App. Div. 659, 664, 140 N.Y. Supp.
536, 540 (4th Dep't 1913), aff'd without opinion, 213 N.Y. 696, 107 N.E. 1075
(1915).
7 Laws of N.Y. 1914, c. 369, § 249(3), now N.Y. BANKING LAW § 239(3).
8 Inda v. Inda, 288 N.Y. 315, 43 N.E.2d 59 (1942); Matter of Juedel, 280
N.Y. 37, 41, 19 N.E.2d 671, 672 (1939) (dictum); see Matter of Fenelon, 262
N.Y. 308, 186 N.E. 794 (1933).
9 "The plain implication is that as between the depositors themselves, the
form of the deposit gives rise to a presumption and nothing more, but that after
the death of either leaving a deposit then subsisting, the presumption becomes
conclusive as to the title of the survivor." Moskowitz v. Marrow, 251 N.Y. 380,
397, 167 N.E. 506, 512 (1929).10 Inda v. Inda, supra note 8.
11 Matter of Porianda, 256 N.Y. 423, 425, 176 N.E. 826, 827 (1931)
(dictum).
2 262 N.Y. 57, 186 N.E. 201, rev'd on other grounds, 262 N.Y. 308, 186 N.E.
794 (1933).
13 270 App. Div. 348, 59 N.Y.S.2d 643 (3d Dep't), aff'd inem., 296 N.Y. 585,
68 N.E.2d 875 (1946).
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case, where by operation of the statute, the survivor was entitled to
the money in the accounts. 14 The majority, however, held the form
of the account was not controlling and resorted to the Clary v.
Fitzgerald formula of weighing extrinsic evidence to determine
whether the decedent had, in effect, intended to create a joint tenancy.
The reasoning of the Court in support of this conclusion is none too
clear. It appears that the fact that the decedent was suffering from a
fatal illness, coupled with the fact that her actual intention was to
convey powers of attorney, permitted, in the mind of the majority, the
inference thai the decedent was incompetent; and, therefore, the in-
strument was not knowingly and consciously drawn. Under the cir-
cumstances, incompetency could have two possible implications:
(1) that there was a lack of rational capacity, of which there was no
evidence, or (2) that there was a lack of knowledge of the full legal
implications of the instrument signed. Here the law charges a person
with the legal consequences of the instrument signed, regardless of
the lack of such knowledge.1 5
Such a conclusion as was reached in the present case has de-
stroyed the conclusive effect of the statutory presumption and can
only lead to an uncertainty in the law which the Legislature had at-
tempted to erase with this conclusive provision. 6 It would seem that
the Court could have given effect to the intention of the decedent by
the imposition of a trust on the accounts, and thus avoided doing
violence to the act of the Legislature.
BANKS AND BANKING-NOTES DISCOUNTED BY NoN-BANKING
CORPORATION IN VIOLATION OF BANKING LAW SECTION 131 AND
GENERAL CORPORATION LAW SECTION 18 HELD Vom.-Plaintiff, an
accommodation indorser of five promissory notes.made to secure a
loan by defendant Discount Factors to the maker, sues to recover on
three notes alleging that they are invalid and that he made payment
under a mistake of law. The notes had no legal inception prior to
14 "... [T]he simple fact is that we are here concerned . . .with a docu-
ment creating a joint bank account. This, the legislature has said in the'plainest
of language, conclusively effects a right in the survivor, absent evidence of
incapacity, fraud or undue influence, to the balance in the account upon the
other's death." Matter of Creeknore, 1 N.Y.2d 284, 299-300, 135 N.E.2d 193,
201 (1956).
15 Knight v. Kitchin, 237 App. Div. 506, 511, 261 N.Y. Supp. 809, 815 (4th
Dep't 1933) (dictum).
16 In 1950, upon recommendation of the Law Revision Commission, a bill
excising the presumptive evidence clause from section 239(3) was submitted to
Judiciary Committee of the Legislature, but was never reported out of com-
mittee. See Ra'oaT, N.Y. LAw RE VsioN CoMMissioN 515, 567 (1950).
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